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Michi NISHIHARAyz, Takashi SHIBATAx
Abstract
This paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a ¯rm in distress have
a choice of whether to proceed to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary
time. In the model, we show the following results. Fewer asset sales, lower ¯nancing,
debt renegotiation, and running costs, a lower premium to the debt holders, a lower
cash °ow volatility, and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders' incentive to
choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation. In the debt renegotiation process, the
shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity ¯nancing to retire a part of
the debt value to the debt holders. The timing of debt restructuring always coincides
with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation. Most notably, the shareholders do
not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high ¯nancing costs. The
possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the
optimal capital structure.
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1 Introduction
There has been a growing trend to investigate dynamic investment and ¯nancing models in
corporate ¯nance. One of the advantages of analyzing dynamic models over static models
is that we can deal with optimal timing problems more clearly. For instance, Mauer
and Sarkar (2005) and Sundaresan and Wang (2007) derived the optimal investment
timing with the optimal capital structure.1 Compared to an increasing number of papers
regarding dynamic investment and ¯nancing problems, there are not so many papers
that analyze dynamic models of divestment and deleveraging. Although a number of
the papers, including seminal works by Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral
and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000), focus on liquidation and debt
renegotiation problems of a ¯rm in ¯nancial distress, they usually ignore problems related
to downsizing and continuing to operate a ¯rm.2 In the real world, it is not unusual
to downsize and/or deleverage a ¯rm's operations during an economic downturn. For
example, in the Japanese electronics industry, Panasonic, Sony, and Sharp corporations
have experienced large-scale downsizing in recent years.
We reveal interactions of downsizing, debt restructuring, and liquidation in the fol-
lowing dynamic model. The equity holders of a levered ¯rm in distress face a problem
of choosing either debt restructuring or direct liquidation. They can also choose the op-
timal timing. If they choose debt restructuring, they can reduce the coupon payments
but are forced to sell a fraction of assets, where following the standard assumption (e.g.,
Mella-Barral (1999) and Gryglewicz (2009)), we assume that partial liquidation is less
e±cient than full liquidation in terms of asset price (economies of scale). We do not
focus on the debt holders' strategic behaviour and suppose that the debt holders accept
the shareholders' proposal with a su±cient premium compared to the value without debt
renegotiation.3 Naturally, the equity holders need to pay back more to the debt hold-
ers when they wish to reduce more coupon payments and continue the ¯rm's operation
longer. The equity holders also pay debt renegotiation costs, such as transaction costs,
as well as equity ¯nancing costs that arise when the proceeds from selling assets cannot
cover all costs associated with debt renegotiation. Considering the trade-o®, the equity
holders optimize the coupon reduction and its timing. The equity holders can choose
direct liquidation when it is more bene¯cial than debt restructuring.
Our analysis of the model yields several results about when, how, and whether the ¯rm
proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation. First, we show that the timing of debt
restructuring is always equal to that of liquidation without debt renegotiation if it occurs.
1Recently, Shibata and Nishihara (2012), Shibata and Nishihara (2015a), and Shibata and Nishihara (2015b)
extended their analysis to the cases involving debt ¯nancing constraints.
2A notable exception is Reindl (2013), who clari¯ed conditions under which a ¯rm decreases its leverage
ratio along with selling assets by analyzing a dynamic game between equity and debt holders.
3This paper also explores the impact of the debt holders' bargaining power by varying the premium.
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This is because of the timing when the shareholders can most e±ciently reduce the value
which they retire to the debt holders. This result is in line with Lambrecht (2001) and
Moraux and Silaghi (2014), but they do not consider asset sale and payback to the debt
holders in exchange for the coupon reduction. We show that, unlike the previous results,
the shareholders greatly decrease the coupon so that they need to pay back the partial
debt value to the debt holders. The shareholders use costly equity ¯nancing in addition
to the proceeds from selling assets to repay the partial debt value in debt restructuring.
This is because operating the ¯rm longer through deleveraging is more bene¯cial to the
equity holders even though they pay temporarily higher costs in debt restructuring.
A most notable result is that the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restruc-
turing. In other words, if asset sale is not forced, they adjust the coupon reduction and
equity ¯nancing to avoid asset sale. This result is di®erent from the following intuition:
the equity holders may wish to sell more assets to cover the costs of debt renegotiation
even if asset sale is less advantageous from the viewpoint of asset price. It is not optimal
for the shareholders to sell assets to ¯nance the repayment value even when equity ¯nanc-
ing is very costly. Instead of avoiding asset sale, they mitigate the coupon reduction and
decrease the repayment value to the debt holders.
Our result stems not only from the assumption of economies of scale. A more important
motivation is the timing of debt restructuring. Because the debt restructuring time is
earlier than the ¯nal liquidation time, more losses are associated with asset sale at the
debt restructuring time. Indeed, the shareholders can reduce the loss by deferring asset
sale as long as possible, i.e., until the ¯nal liquidation time. This result is consistent with
the following empirical evidence. Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) and Maksimovic and
Phillips (2001) showed that the timing of asset sale is not related to debt renegotiation
but that it is motivated by improvement of the resource allocation. Because asset sale
does not improve the resource allocation in our model, the shareholders' unwillingness to
sell assets is in line with their result. Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan (2013) also showed
that asset sales and investments are signi¯cantly and positively correlated. Relatedly,
Weiss and Wruck (1998) illustrated a real-world example of ine±cient asset sales during
the debt restructuring process.
Another notable result is the impact of the initial coupon of debt on the shareholders'
choice of whether to proceed to debt restructuring or direct liquidation. As the initial
coupon is higher, the shareholders are more likely to proceed to debt renegotiation to
avoid direct liquidation. This is because for a higher initial coupon the equity holders
can possibly reduce more coupon payments via earlier debt renegotiation. Then, they can
greatly extend the ¯rm's survival time, which leads to more surplus from debt renego-
tiation. This result predicts that larger/older ¯rms, which tend to have more debt, are
more likely to avoid direct liquidation. This prediction is consistent with the empirical
evidence in Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006). Although we do not consider multiple debt
renegotiations, our ¯nding is also consistent with that of Moraux and Silaghi (2014), who
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showed that due to renegotiation costs equity holders give up any further renegotiation
after the coupon is reduced to a su±ciently low level.?
We also show that, in addition to fewer asset sales and a higher initial coupon, lower
¯nancing, debt renegotiation, and running costs, as well as a lower premium to the debt
holders and a lower volatility, increase the shareholders' incentive to proceed to debt
restructuring. These results are consistent with the stylized fact that larger/older/higher-
productivity ¯rms are more likely to avoid direct liquidation (e.g., Bris, Welch, and Zhu
(2006), Maksimovic and Phillips (1998)).
In addition, we examine how the optimal capital structure, where the initial coupon
of debt is chosen to maximize the ¯rm value, di®ers in cases with and without debt
renegotiation in the future. In the case of taking account of debt renegotiation in the
future, the ¯rm takes a higher coupon, leverage, and credit spread at the initial time.
This is because, by increasing the coupon, leverage, and credit spread at the initial time,
the ¯rm can gain more bene¯ts of debt renegotiation. Similar results are also documented
in Moraux and Silaghi (2014) and Christensen, Flor, Lando, and Miltersen (2014).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. As a benchmark, Section 2
examines the direct and partial liquidation options of an unlevered ¯rm and shows that
the unlevered ¯rm always prefers direct liquidation to downsizing under the assumption of
scales of economies. In Section 3.1, we examine the liquidation option of the levered ¯rm.
In Section 3.2, we explore the downsizing and debt restructuring option of the levered
¯rm. In Section 4, we present a wide range of numerical examples and explain key results.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Unlevered ¯rm
2.1 Direct liquidation
Throughout this paper, we consider a risk-neutral ¯rm that is receiving EBIT (Earnings
before interests and taxes) X(t)¡w at time t, where X(t) is a stochastic component and
w(¸ 0) is a constant running cost. Following the standard real options literature, we
assume that X(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dX(t) = ¹X(t)dt+ ¾X(t)dB(t) (t > 0); X(0) = x;
where B(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion de¯ned in a probability space (­;F ;P)
and ¹; ¾(> 0) and x(> 0) are constants. Positive constants r and ¿ 2 (0; 1) denote the
interest rate and the corporate tax rate, respectively. For convergence, we assume that
r > ¹. For the economic rationale behind these standard assumptions, refer to Dixit and
Pindyck (1994).
Consider an all-equity ¯rm that has an option to sell whole assets (denoted by \direct
liquidation") and gain PU (X(TU ); 1) after taxes at an arbitrary time TU . The subscript
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U stands for the unlevered case. We assume that by selling a fraction a 2 (0; 1) of assets
(denoted by \partial liquidation" or \asset sale") at time t, the shareholders receive the
proceeds PU (X(t); a) after taxes. Assume that PU (x; a) = FU (a)x + GU (a), where the
functions FU (¢) and GU (¢) are non-decreasing and convex functions with FU (0) = GU (0) =
0.4 The convexity means that partial liquidation destroys existing economies of scale,
and hence selling assets sequentially is less pro¯table than selling assets simultaneously.
Following most papers, including Mella-Barral (1999) and Gryglewicz (2009), we assume
the economies of scale. Also, note that in most cases, assets sold piecemeal are not as
valuable as the same assets sold as a going concern. By this assumption, we can also
di®erentiate our study from Reindl (2013), who do not directly relate a partial liquidation
value with a full liquidation value. We presume that the initial value x is su±ciently high
to exclude (partial) liquidation at the initial time.
Now, consider the problem of the equity holders who optimize the direct liquidation
time TU . The equity value, denoted by EU (x), which is the same as the ¯rm value in the
unlevered case, is equal to
EU (x) = sup
TU
E[
Z TU
0
e¡rt(1¡ ¿)(X(t)¡ w)dt+ e¡rTUPU (X(TU ); 1)]; (1)
where the liquidation time TU is optimized over all stopping times. In the standard
manner (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), we can explicitly solve problem (1) as follows.
For (1¡ ¿)=(r ¡ ¹)¡ FU (1) > 0, we have
EU (x) =
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+ sup
TU
E[e¡rTU
µ
¡
µ
1¡ ¿
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (1)
¶
X(TU ) +
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+GU (1)
¶
]
=
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
µ
¡
µ
1¡ ¿
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (1)
¶
x¤U +
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+GU (1)
¶µ
x
x¤U
¶°
(2)
for x ¸ x¤U , where ° = 1=2 ¡ ¹=¾2 ¡
p
(¹=¾2 ¡ 1=2)2 + 2r=¾2(< 0) and the liquidation
trigger x¤U is given by
x¤U =
°
° ¡ 1
µ
1¡ ¿
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (1)
¶¡1µ(1¡ ¿)w
r
+GU (1)
¶
: (3)
The optimal liquidation time is expressed as T ¤U = ft ¸ 0 j X(t) · x¤Ug. Throughout the
paper, following the standard literature (e.g., Leland (1994) and Mella-Barral (1999)), we
presume that (1¡ ¿)=(r ¡ ¹)¡ FU (1) > 0. Note that only when w and GU (1) are equal
to zero, the equity holders perpetually operate the ¯rm without liquidation. In that case,
we have x¤U = 0 and EU (x) = (1 ¡ ¿)x=(r ¡ ¹), which correspond to the unlevered case
in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). In the next subsection, we will derive the equity
value in the case of partial liquidation and compare it with (2) to clarify whether the
shareholders prefer direct liquidation or asset sale.
4Following the standard literature, such as Leland (1994), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Mella-Barral
(1999), and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), we assume that the liquidation value is linear with respect to the
state variable.
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2.2 Partial liquidation
We consider a problem of whether the ¯rm should sell its assets at once or piecemeal.
In order to focus the problem, in the piecemeal case, we limit our attention to a case in
which the ¯rm sell assets only twice. We assume that the shareholders ¯rst sell a fraction
a 2 (0; 1) of assets and after that liquidate the ¯rm by selling the remaining fraction 1¡a.
We now suppose that a is a given constant.
Consider an all-equity ¯rm that has an option to sell assets and gain PU (X(TU1); a) at
an arbitrary time TU1. Assume that the ¯rm's downsizing reduces EBIT from X(t) ¡ w
to (1¡ a)(X(t)¡ w). The equity value, denoted by EU1(x), is equal to
EU1(x) = sup
TU1
E[
Z TU1
0
e¡rt(1¡¿)(X(t)¡w)dt+e¡rTU1PU (X(TU1); a))+e¡rTU1EU2(X(TU1))];
(4)
where the downsizing time TU1 is optimized over all stopping time, and the equity value
after downsizing, denoted by EU2(X(TU1)), is given by
EU2(X(TU1)) = sup
TU2
EX(TU1)[
Z TU2
TU1
e¡r(t¡TU1)(1¡ ¿)(1¡ a)(X(t)¡ w)dt
+ e¡r(TU2¡TU1)PU (X(TU1); 1¡ a))]; (5)
where the liquidation time TU2 is optimized over all stopping time later than TU1. The
notation EX(TU1)[¢] denotes the expectation conditional to t = TU1 and X(t) = X(TU1).
As in (2), we can explicitly solve problem (5) as follows:
EU2(X(TU1)) =
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ a)X(TU1)
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ a)w
r
+
µ
¡
µ
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ a)
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (1¡ a)
¶
x¤U2 +
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ a)w
r
+GU (1¡ a)
¶µ
X(TU1)
x¤U2
¶°
for X(TU1) ¸ x¤U2, where the optimal liquidation trigger x¤U2 is
x¤U2 =
°
° ¡ 1
µ
1¡ ¿
r ¡ ¹ ¡
FU (1¡ a)
1¡ a
¶¡1µ(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
GU (1¡ a)
1¡ a
¶
: (6)
Note that EU2(X(TU1)) = FU (1¡ a)X(TU1) +GU (1¡ a) for X(TU1) < x¤U2.
Then, we can explicitly solve problem (4) as follows:
EU1(x) =
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
½
¡
µ
(1¡ ¿)a
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (a)
¶
x¤U1 +
(1¡ ¿)aw
r
+GU (a)
¾µ
x
x¤U1
¶°
+
½
¡
µ
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ a)
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (1¡ a)
¶
x¤U2 +
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ a)w
r
+GU (1¡ a)
¾µ
x
x¤U2
¶°
(7)
for x ¸ x¤U1, where the downsizing trigger x¤U1 is
x¤U1 =
°
° ¡ 1
µ
1¡ ¿
r ¡ ¹ ¡
FU (a)
a
¶¡1µ(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
GU (a)
a
¶
(8)
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when x¤U1 > x
¤
U2 is satis¯ed. Otherwise,
EU1(x) =
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
½
¡
µ
(1¡ ¿)
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (a)¡ FU (1¡ a)
¶
x¤¤U1
+
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+GU (a) +GU (1¡ a)
¾µ
x
x¤¤U1
¶°
(9)
for x ¸ x¤¤U1, where liquidation occurs immediately after asset sale and the trigger x¤¤U1 is
de¯ned by
x¤¤U1 =
°
° ¡ 1
µ
1¡ ¿
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FU (a)¡ FU (1¡ a)
¶¡1µ(1¡ ¿)w
r
+GU (a) +GU (1¡ a)
¶
:
In this \piecemeal" case, we assume that the shareholders receive PU (X(TU1); a)+PU (X(TU1); 1¡
a) at the trigger x¤¤U1.
We can easily prove that EU1(x) · EU (x) for an arbitrary a as follows. We con-
sider (4) replaced PU (X(TU1); a) and PU (X(TU1); 1 ¡ a) with aPU (X(TU1); 1) and (1 ¡
a)PU (X(TU1); 1), respectively. We denote this value function by ~EU1(x). Because of the
convexity of FU (¢) andGU (¢), we have PU (X(TU1); a) · aPU (X(TU1); 1) and PU (X(TU1); 1¡
a) · (1 ¡ a)PU (X(TU1); 1). Then, we have EU1(x) · ~EU1(x). Because we can calculate
~EU1(x) following (9) and check that ~EU1(x) = EU (x). Thus, we have EU1(x) · ~EU1(x) =
EU (x).
This result means that the all-equity ¯rm always prefers direct liquidation to partial
liquidation. As we can see from the proof above that the reason lies in the price advantage
of selling whole assets over piecemeal assets (economies of scale). In the absence of
economies of scale (e.g., Reindl (2013)), a ¯rm may prefer partial liquidation. One example
is a case in which ¯re sales are accompanied only by ¯nal liquidation. In the following
sections, we will explore the optimal decisions of the equity holders of the levered ¯rm. It
is a key question to be answered whether the levered ¯rm always chooses direct liquidation
under the assumption of economies of scale.
3 Levered ¯rm
3.1 Direct liquidation
In this subsection, we derive the equity, debt, and ¯rm values of the ¯rm that chooses
direct liquidation. Consider the ¯rm that issued console debt with coupon c and is op-
erating with the asset size a. We denote the equity, debt, and ¯rm values of the ¯rm by
E(x; a; c); D(x; a; c); and V (x; a; c), respectively. As in Section 2, we consider the asset
price function PL(x; a) = FL(a)x + GL(a) for asset sale, where the functions FL(¢) and
GL(¢) are non-decreasing and convex functions with FL(0) = GL(0) = 0. In the levered
case, the price function PL(x; a) can be di®erent from PU (x; a), although we do not specify
the relation.
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Following the standard manner (e.g., Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland
(2001)), we have
E(x; a; c) =E[
Z T ¤L
0
e¡rt(1¡ ¿)(aX(t)¡ aw ¡ c)dt]
=
(1¡ ¿)ax
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)(aw + c)
r
¡
µ
(1¡ ¿)ax¤L(a; c)
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)(aw + c)
r
¶µ
x
x¤L(a; c)
¶°
(10)
D(x; a; c) =E[
Z T ¤L
0
e¡rtcdt+ e¡rT
¤
LPL(X(T ¤L); a)]
=
c
r
¡
³ c
r
¡ PL(x¤L(a; c); a)
´µ x
x¤L(a; c)
¶°
(11)
V (x; a; c) =E(x; a; c) +D(x; a; c)
=
(1¡ ¿)ax
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)aw
r
+
¿c
r
¡
µ
(1¡ ¿)ax¤L(a; c)
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)aw
r
+
¿c
r
¡ PL(x¤L(a; c); a)
¶µ
x
x¤L(a; c)
¶°
(12)
for x ¸ x¤L(a; c), where x¤L(a; c) is the liquidation trigger determined by the shareholders
who maximize (10). Actually, it is equal to
x¤L(a; c) =
°(r ¡ ¹)(aw + c)
(° ¡ 1)ra ; (13)
and T ¤L = infft ¸ 0 j X(t) · x¤L(a; c)g (we omit arguments (a; c) of T ¤L). The equations
above presume that debt is risky, i.e., PL(x¤L(a; c); a) < c=r because we are interested only
in risky debt. This condition is satis¯ed in all numerical examples in Section 4.
When the ¯rm with an initial coupon c0 chooses direct liquidation without debt rene-
gotiation, its equity, debt, and ¯rm values become E(x; 1; c0); D(x; 1; c0); and V (x; 1; c0),
respectively. In this case, we denote by E(x) = E(x; 1; c0) and x¤L = x
¤
L(1; c) to simplify
the notations. Comparing E(x) with the equity value, denoted by EL1(x), in the case of
debt restructuring, the equity holders decide whether they proceed to direct liquidation or
debt restructuring. In the next subsection, we will examine the case of debt restructuring.
3.2 Debt restructuring with asset sale
In this section, we derive the equity, debt, and ¯rm values, denoted by EL1(x); DL1(x),
and VL1(x), respectively, of the ¯rm that chooses debt restructuring along with partial
liquidation. As in Section 2, we assume that the shareholders ¯rst liquidates a fraction
a 2 (0; 1) of assets and gain PL(X(TL1); a) at time TL1, and after that they liquidate the
remaining fraction 1¡a and gain PL(X(TL1); 1¡a) at time TL2. The shareholders optimize
the partial liquidation and debt restructuring time TL1 and the ¯nal liquidation time TL2.
We now assume a constant a, and we will also examine an optimal a in Section 4.2.1.
In the real world, the debt holders or the third party sometimes force the equity holders
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to sell assets used as the collateral to repay the debt value in default. As documented
in Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008), the forced asset sale is one of the major
debt enforcement frictions.
As in Lambrecht (2001), Moraux and Silaghi (2014), and Christensen, Flor, Lando, and
Miltersen (2014), we assume that the shareholders demand a lump-sum and permanent
reduction in the coupon of debt. Actually, it might be di±cult for a ¯rm to continuously
and marginally (e.g., Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000))
adjust the coupon because of costs associated with the negotiation, adjustment, and
transaction. For instance, Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008) reported high
costs of debt enforcement procedures. At time TL1, the shareholders can reduce the
coupon c0 into a new level cL1 by debt renegotiation.5 At TL1, the equity, debt, and ¯rm
values change to E(X(TL1); 1¡ a; cL1); D(X(TL1); 1¡ a; cL1), and V (X(TL1); 1¡ a; cL1),
respectively. The ¯nal liquidation time is equal to T ¤L2 = infft ¸ 0 j X(t) · x¤L2 = x¤L(1¡
a; cL1)g under the assumption that TL1 · T ¤L2. The debt holders would refuse the coupon
reduction proposed by the shareholders unless it is bene¯cial to them. For simplicity, we do
not model a dynamic game between the equity and debt holders. Instead, we assume that
the shareholders need to pay back (1 + kD)D(X(TL1); 1; c0)| {z }
original debt value
¡D(X(TL1); 1¡ a; cL1)| {z }
new debt value
to
satisfy the debt holders, where a parameter kD(¸ 0) measures the debt holders' premium,
if it is positive. Although we do not model a bargaining game between equity and debt
holders, kD can be also regarded as proxy for the debt holders' bargaining power in debt
renegotiation.6
In addition, we assume that external costs kRD(X(TL1); 1; c0), such as transaction
costs, are accompanied by debt restructuring, where kR is a non-negative parameter. Note
that kD (kR) becomes higher (lower) as debt holdings are more concentrated. In total, at
time TL1, the shareholders pay the costs (1 + kD + kR)D(X(TL1); 1; c0)¡D(X(TL1); 1¡
a; cL1) in exchange for the coupon reduction from c0 to cL1.
Now, we solve the shareholders' problem of optimizing TL1 = infft ¸ 0 j X(t) ·
5This paper focuses on a ¯nancially distressed situation, and hence, the model does not allow the shareholders
to increase the coupon when EBIT goes up. Christensen, Flor, Lando, and Miltersen (2014) assumed the callable
debt to consider the possibility of increasing debt.
6In other words, we assume a sort of debt enforcement procedure that protects the creditors from su®ering
loss by the shareholders' strategic default. Although we take kD as a given parameter, it should satisfy that
PL(X(TL1); 1) · D(X(TL1); 1; c0) · (1+kD)D(X(TL1); 1; c0) · c=r. (1+kD)D(X(TL1); 1; c0) is not necessarily
equal to c=r (face value) because violations of absolutely priority rule frequently occur in debt restructuring
(e.g., Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006)).
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xL1g(· T ¤L2) and cL1(· c0) as follows:
EL1(x) = sup
TL1;cL1
E[
Z TL1
0
e¡rt(1¡ ¿)(X(t)¡ w ¡ c0)dt| {z }
value before asset sale
+e¡rTL1fPL(X(TL1); a)| {z }
asset price
¡ f(1 + kD + kR)D(X(TL1); 1; c0)¡D(X(TL1); 1¡ a; cL1)g| {z }
total costs
+E(X(TL1); 1¡ a; cL1)| {z }
value after asset sale
g]
=
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)(w + c0)
r
+ sup
xL1;cL1
½
V (xL1; 1¡ a; cL1) + PL(xL1; a)
¡ (1 + kD + kR)D(xL1; 1; c0)¡ (1¡ ¿)xL1
r ¡ ¹ +
(1¡ ¿)(w + c0)
r
¾µ
x
xL1
¶°
; (14)
where we reduce the original problem to the problem (14) of optimizing the debt restruc-
turing trigger, denoted by xL1 2 [x¤L2; x], and the coupon cL1 2 [0; c0].
Next, we consider the shareholders' behavior at the debt renegotiation trigger xL1
more carefully. At xL1, they need the funds
EF = (1 + kD + kR)D(xL1; 1; c0)¡D(xL1; 1¡ a; cL1)| {z }
total costs
¡PL(xL1; a)| {z }
asset price
(15)
if EF is positive. Formally, they use equity ¯nancing to raise the funds. In fact, however,
it is di±cult and costly for especially smaller/younger ¯rms during an economic downturn
to use external equity ¯nancing (e.g., Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)). Taking the stylized fact into
account, we assume the following equity ¯nancing cost kF . The shareholders need to pay
the proportional ¯nancing cost
kF maxfEF; 0g (16)
when using equity ¯nancing, where kF (¸ 0) is a constant. The parameter kF is higher for
smaller/younger ¯rms in a worse economy. If the proceeds from selling assets cover the
total costs of the debt renegotiations, the shareholders do not raise the funds. Unlike in
the unlevered case, the ¯nancing costs may be a ¯rm's great motive for selling assets even
though partial liquidation is less advantageous in terms of asset price. This point will be
closely explored in Section 4.2.1. In the presence of the equity ¯nancing cost, we modify
the objective function of the problem (14) with the subtractive term (16) £(x=xL1)° .
Note that if the ¯nancing cost kF goes to in¯nity, the problem is subject to the constraint
(1 + kD + kR)D(xL1; 1; c0)¡D(xL1; 1¡ a; cL1) · PL(xL1; a): (17)
When a = 0; kD = 0, and the ¯nancing constraint (17) are assumed, our model corre-
sponds to the debt renegotiation model of Lambrecht (2001) and the single debt rene-
gotiation model of Moraux and Silaghi (2014) (the case where the shareholders have full
bargaining power).
The equity holders obtain the higher value of E(x) and EL1(x). Note that the in-
equality between E(x) and EL1(x) does not depend on x, and hence, the shareholders
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have no incentive to change their decision on the way to liquidation. As will be shown in
Section 4, unlike in the unlevered case in Section 2, the decision whether to proceed to
debt restructuring or direct liquidation depends on the parameter values.
We derive also the debt and ¯rm values, denoted by DL1(x) and VL1(x) respectively,
in the debt restructuring case. We denote the optimal debt restructuring time, debt
restructuring trigger, ¯nal liquidation trigger and coupon by T ¤L1; x
¤
L1; x
¤
L2, and c
¤
L1. Using
T ¤L1; x
¤
L1, and c
¤
L1, we have
DL1(x) = E[
Z T ¤L1
0
e¡rtc0dt+ e¡rT
¤
L1f(1 + kD)D(X(T ¤L1); 1; c0)¡D(X(T ¤L1); 1¡ a; c¤L1)
+D(X(T ¤L1); 1¡ a; c¤L1)g]
=
c
r
¡
³ c
r
¡ (1 + kD)D(x¤L1; 1; c0)
´µ x
x¤L1
¶°
(18)
VL1(x) = EL1(x) +DL1(x)
=
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
¿c0
r
¡
½
(1¡ ¿)x¤L1
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
¿c0
r
¡ V (x¤L1; 1¡ a; c¤L1) + PL(x¤L1; a)¡ kRD(x¤L1; 1; c0)
¾µ
x
x¤L1
¶°
(19)
for x ¸ x¤L1. We presume that c=r ¸ (1 + kD)D(x¤L1; 1; c0), which is satis¯ed in all
numerical examples in Section 4. Also note that in the debt restructuring case, the ¯nal
liquidation occurs at time T ¤L2 = infft ¸ 0 j X(t) · x¤L2 = x¤L(1¡ a; c¤L1)g.
In the remainder of this section, we add an explanation why this paper does not assume
the shareholders who maximize the ¯rm value and share the surplus with the debt holders
through a bargaining game. In the case of ¯rm value maximization, the ¯rm does not need
to proceed to debt renegotiation but just continues to operate permanently or liquidate
the ¯rm at a very low liquidation trigger x¤V . In other words, the ¯rm can choose the
\renegotiation" trigger xL1 at 0 or x¤V with setting the \new" coupon cL1 at c0. Indeed,
when we consider the ¯rm value maximization problem, the ¯rm value becomes
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
¿c0
r
+ sup
xV
½
¡ (1¡ ¿)xV
r ¡ ¹ +
(1¡ ¿)w
r
¡ ¿c0
r
+ PL(xV ; 1)
¾µ
x
xV
¶°
=
8>>>><>>>>:
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
¿c0
r
+
½
¡ (1¡ ¿)x
¤
V
r ¡ ¹ +
(1¡ ¿)w
r
¡ ¿c0
r
+ PL(x¤V ; 1)
¾µ
x
x¤V
¶°
(if (1¡ ¿)w=r ¡ ¿c0=r +GL(1) > 0)
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)w
r
+
¿c0
r
(otherwise);
(20)
where the liquidation trigger x¤V is de¯ned by
x¤V =
°
° ¡ 1
µ
1¡ ¿
r ¡ ¹ ¡ FL(1)
¶¡1µ(1¡ ¿)w
r
¡ ¿c0
r
+GL(1)
¶
; (21)
if (1 ¡ ¿)w=r ¡ ¿c0=r + GL(1) > 0. Note that (21) is of the same form as (3) except for
the tax advantage ¿c0=r. When (1 ¡ ¿)w=r ¡ ¿c0=r + GL(1) · 0, the ¯rm continues to
operate perpetually.
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In Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Mella-Barral (1999), due to ¿ = 0, the ¯rm
liquidates at the liquidation trigger like (3) through debt renegotiation, which maximizes
the ¯rm value. On the other hand, in the presence of tax advantages of debt, most of the
literature restricts bene¯ts of tax savings when the equity and debt holders cooperate to
maximize the ¯rm value. For example, Fan and Sundaresan (2000) considered the debt
renegotiation process assuming no tax advantage of debt while the equity and debt holders
cooperate to adjust the coupon. Without this sort of restriction, in the basic models,
such as those provided by Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) (note that
w = 0), the equity and debt holders could continue to operate the ¯rm perpetually and
enjoy tax savings without potential default costs. Thus, in our model, it is not meaningful
to consider the ¯rm value maximization problem (20), allowing tax advantage of debt and a
bargaining problem between the equity and debt holders. As in Lambrecht (2001), Reindl
(2013), Christensen, Flor, Lando, and Miltersen (2014), Moraux and Silaghi (2014), we
consider the equity holders' value maximization problem (14).
4 Numerical analysis and implications
4.1 Basic results
In this section, we compute problem (14) with the ¯nancing costs (16) for the base pa-
rameter values as follows:7
r = 0:06; ¹ = 0:01; ¾ = 0:2; ¿ = 0:15; x = 2; w = 0:5; a = 0:1; c0 = 2; kD = kR = 0:05; kF = 0:1:
(22)
We also de¯ne the asset price by PL(x; a) = 0:6a1:01x=(r ¡ ¹) + 2a1:01 in the base case.
Note that for x = 1 the full liquidation value PL(x; 1) = 0:6x=(r ¡ ¹) + 2 is the same as
0:7x=(r ¡ ¹), which is often used as the liquidation value of the basic literature.8
For the base parameter (22), we have Table 1, where LV = D(x¤L; 1¡a; c¤L1)=V (x¤L; 1¡
a; c¤L1) (leverage ratio), CS = c
¤
L1=D(x
¤
L; 1 ¡ a; c¤L1) ¡ r (credit spread), and EF = (1 +
kD+kR)D(x¤L1; 1; c0)¡D(x¤L1; 1¡a; c¤L1)¡PL(x¤L1; a) (newly issued equity value). Because
EL1(x) = 5:91 > E(x) = 5:58, the equity holders choose debt renegotiation. At the debt
renegotiation trigger x¤L1 = 1:25, they reduce the coupon from c0 = 2 to c
¤
L1 = 1:07;
instead, they need to pay the total costs (1+ kD+ kR)D(x¤L1; 1; c0)¡D(x¤L1; 1¡ a; cL1) =
3:02. The proceeds from asset sale, PL(x¤L1; a) = 1:44, are not su±cient to cover the costs,
and hence they raise new equity ¯nancing EF = 1:58. Then, the new leverage ratio and
7The growth rate ¹ is set at a small value because we focus on the ¯rm approaching liquidation in an
economic downturn. Following the standard literature, we set r and ¿ . The initial state x is not substantial
because it can be normalized. In Section 4.2, we will show the comparative statics with respect to the other
parameter values.
8In the parameter values, the liquidation trigger is around 1. We also computed many results, changing the
parameter values of 0:6; 1:01, and 2. The results are straightforward and are omitted from the paper.
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credit spread become LV = 0:846 and CS = 0:0207, respectively. The ¯rm continues
to operate until the state variable X(t) hits the ¯nal liquidation trigger x¤L2 = 0:842.
Although this is a typical outcome, several values depend on the parameter values. In the
next subsection, we will explain the comparative statics results. Now, we explain several
robust ¯ndings which hold true regardless of parameter values.
In the base case, because of EF = 1:58 > 0, the shareholders need equity ¯nancing to
pay the costs associated with debt renegotiation. According to our computation for a wide
range of parameter values, this result remains true even when the equity ¯nancing cost
kF is very high. Of course, the shareholders su±ciently mitigate the coupon reduction to
decrease EF as kF increases. However, EF is always positive unless kF is in¯nite. To
our knowledge, there has been no paper that shows the e±ciency of equity ¯nancing in
debt restructuring. Most of the literature about debt renegotiation, including Lambrecht
(2001) and Moraux and Silaghi (2014), considered neither the partial retirement of debt
nor equity ¯nancing. Reindl (2013), who considered the problem of buying back debt and
deleveraging along with selling asset, denied the possibility of equity ¯nancing.
(Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here.)
Next, in Table 1 we ¯nd that the debt restructuring trigger x¤L1 is exactly equal
to the original liquidation trigger x¤L without debt renegotiation. This means that the
leverage ratio without debt renegotiation increases up to 1 right before debt renegotiation.
We made numerous computations in addition to presented examples and veri¯ed that
x¤L1 = x
¤
L in all cases. For instance, Figure 1 shows that x
¤
L1 = x
¤
L = 1:25 without regard
to the fraction of asset sale a, although, as will be checked in Figure 3 of Section 4.2.1, the
new coupon c¤L1 varies with a. While this result does not hold in debt renegotiation models
with a temporary reduction in the coupon (e.g., Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and
Fan and Sundaresan (2000)), it is in line with the results in previous models with a lump-
sum and permanent reduction in the coupon. Actually, Lambrecht (2001) and Moraux
and Silaghi (2014) showed the same result, although they did not consider either asset
sale or debt retirement. In Reindl (2013), the debt restructuring timing can be earlier
depending on the asset price. This is because his assumption, unlike our assumption of
PL(x; a), does not directly relate partial liquidation value and the bankruptcy value, and
hence partial liquidation can be more pro¯table than full liquidation. In our view, debt
restructuring always takes place at the original liquidation trigger as long as we assume
economies of scale in production relating asset sale with the full liquidation value.
Using Figure 2, we explain the rationale behind the result that x¤L1 = x
¤
L. Figure 2
depicts the debt value D(xL1; 1; c0) as a function of xL1. For xL1 ¸ x¤L, D(xL1; 1; c0) is
concave and increasing. Because of the concavity, the shareholders can e±ciently decrease
the repayment value by waiting until X(t) reaches x¤L. They have no incentive to strate-
gically default before the original liquidation time because of the high repayment value.
On the other hand, the shareholders do not delay the debt renegotiation timing after the
original liquidation time because they do not wish to continue to pay the initial coupon
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c0 any longer. The debt value D(xL1; 1; c0) coincides with a linear function PL(xL1; 1)
for xL1 · x¤L = 1:25, and hence there is no incentive for the shareholders to delay debt
renegotiation any longer. Accordingly, the equity holders optimally choose the same debt
renegotiation timing as the liquidation timing, i.e., x¤L1 = x
¤
L.
Based on the result above, from now on we suppose that x¤L1 = x
¤
L and examine the
equity holders' decision in more details. Under the condition, we can reduce (14) to the
following:
EL1(x) =
(1¡ ¿)x
r ¡ ¹ ¡
(1¡ ¿)(w + c0)
r
+ sup
cL1
V (x¤L; 1¡ a; cL1)
µ
x
x¤L
¶°
+
½
PL(x¤L; a)
¡ (1 + kD + kR)PL(x¤L; 1)¡
(1¡ ¿)x¤L
r ¡ ¹ +
(1¡ ¿)(w + c0)
r
¾µ
x
x¤L
¶°
; (23)
where we used D(x¤L; 1; c0) = PL(x
¤
L; 1). In the absence of ¯nancing costs, the condition
under which debt renegotiation is preferred is as follows:
EL1(x) > E(x)
,V (x¤L; 1¡ a; c¤L1) + PL(x¤L; a)¡ (1 + kD + kR)PL(x¤L; 1) > 0: (24)
For a = w = kD = kR = 0, we can ¯nd c < c0 such that D(x¤L; 1; c) = PL(x
¤
L; 1) because
D(x¤L; 1; c) is hump-shaped with respect to c · c0 (e.g., Leland (1994), Lambrecht (2001),
and Figure 1 of Moraux and Silaghi (2014)). Using this c, we have
V (x¤L; 1; c
¤
L1)¡ PL(x¤L; 1) ¸V (x¤L; 1; c)¡ PL(x¤L; 1)
=E(x¤L; 1; c)
>0:
That is, without asset sale, operating costs, and costs associated with debt restructuring,
the shareholders always prefer debt renegotiation to liquidation. This result remains
unchanged even in the presence of a ¯nancing cost because we have EF = 0 for the
same c. The similar results were found in many papers (e.g., Lambrecht (2001), Reindl
(2013), and Moraux and Silaghi (2014)). On the other hand, if any of a;w; kD, and kR
are positive, the shareholders may proceed to direct liquidation. In the next subsection,
we will examine how the parameter values a®ect the equity holders' decision of whether
to proceed to debt restructuring or direct liquidation.
4.2 Comparative statics
This section analyzes comparative statics with respect to parameters a; c0; ¾; kF ; kD, and
w, and it reveals how these parameters a®ect the shareholders' optimal decision. Above
all, the impacts of the fraction of asset sale a and the initial coupon c0 are novel and
discussed in detail. In each ¯gure, the other parameter values are ¯xed at the base case
(22). Each ¯gure contains six panels which show equity values (EL1(x) and EL(x)),
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new coupons (c¤L1), new and original liquidation (renegotiation) triggers (x
¤
L2 and x
¤
L(=
x¤L1)), new leverage ratios (LV = D(x
¤
L; 1¡ a; c¤L1)=V (x¤L; 1¡ a; c¤L1)), new credit spread
(CS = c¤L1=D(x
¤
L; 1 ¡ a; c¤L1) ¡ r), and the newly issued equity value (EF = (1 + kD +
kR)D(x¤L1; 1; c0)¡D(x¤L1; 1¡ a; c¤L1)¡PL(x¤L1; a)). In some ¯gures, we show other values
to explore the results more closely.
4.2.1 Fraction of asset sale a
(Insert Figure 3 around here.)
Figure 3 shows the panels with varying levels of the fraction of asset sale a. We can
see from the top left panel that EL1(x) monotonically decreases with a. For a ¸ 0:34,
the shareholders prefer to liquidate the ¯rm because of the ine±ciency in the partial asset
sale in debt renegotiation. According to a number of computations, we ¯nd that partial
liquidation always destroys the equity value. Partial liquidation is less e±cient not only
because PL(x; ¢) is convex but also because for x = x¤L, which is larger than x¤L2, the equity
holders pay the fundamental costs of partial liquidation, i.e., (a ¡ 0:6a1:01)x=(r ¡ ¹). In
other words, they wish to defer all liquidation costs until X(t) hits the ¯nal liquidation
trigger x¤L2. If the shareholders can optimize a in debt renegotiation, they always choose
a = 0 (debt reorganization with no asset sale). Instead, they optimally adjust the coupon
reduction and use equity ¯nancing. Actually, as checked in the bottom right panel of
Figure 3, selling assets adversely increases the newly issued equity value because it reduces
the new debt value D(x¤L; 1¡ a;C¤L1) more than the increase in PL(x¤L; a).
(Insert Figure 4 around here.)
Even if a ¯nancing cost kF is higher (in an extreme case in¯nite) or PL(x; ¢) is linear,
they do not prefer a positive a. Figure 4 shows EL1(x) and E(x) with varying levels
of a, where kF is set at 0:5; 1, and 1:5. The left and right panels show the results for
PL(x; a) = 0:6a1:01x=(r¡¹)+2a1:01 (base case) and PL(x; a) = 0:6ax=(r¡¹)+2a (linear
case), respectively. Although the regions of direct liquidation increase with higher kF , the
equity holders do not voluntarily sell assets in order to repay the partial debt value.
This result is di®erent from the ¯nding of Reindl (2013), who argued that the pos-
sibility of selling assets causes deleveraging. Again, in our view, this is because partial
liquidation can be more pro¯table than full liquidation in the setup of Reindl (2013).
Our result can potentially account for several empirical ¯ndings. Actually, Maksimovic
and Phillips (1998) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) showed that the frequency of
asset sales does not increase during the debt reorganization process. They argued that
lower-productivity ¯rms are more likely to sell assets to higher-productivity ¯rms when
industry output increases, which leads to improvement in the resource allocation. Note
that our model focuses only on a ¯rm's behaviour in declining economies and assumes that
some costs are associated with liquidation. Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan (2013) also
showed that asset sales are related to an increase in investment and resource allocation.
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Relatedly, Weiss and Wruck (1998) documented the case of Eastern Airlines, in which
ine±cient asset sales caused Chapter 11's failure.
The values x¤L2; x
¤
L; LV; and CS are almost constants over a (note the scale of the verti-
cal axis in the ¯gure). This is because the debt service ratio (1¡a)=c¤L1 is almost constant
while c¤L1 decreases with a (see the top right panel of Figure 3). That is, the fraction of
asset sale a does not greatly in°uence the capital structure after debt restructuring.
4.2.2 Initial coupon c0
(Insert Figure 5 around here.)
Figure 5 shows the panels with varying levels of initial coupons c0. Naturally, EL1(x)
and E(x) decrease with a higher c0, while x¤L2 and x
¤
L increase. Interestingly, in the
top left panel, for c0 · 1:65 the shareholders prefer liquidation to debt renegotiation.
This is because, for a higher c0, the equity holders can reduce the coupon more (see the
di®erence between the two lines in the top right panel), which leads to more surplus from
debt renegotiation. Accordingly, a higher c0 increases the incentive to proceed to debt
restructuring rather than direct liquidation.
This result may align with the \too big to fail" theory. Indeed, our model suggests
that larger/older ¯rms with more debt gain more surplus from succeeding in debt renego-
tiation and avoiding full liquidation. Note that due to information asymmetry problems,
smaller/younger ¯rms tend to have limited access to debt (e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1996)). Our prediction is also consistent with the stylized fact that larger/older
¯rms are more likely to proceed to debt renegotiation rather than direct liquidation (e.g.,
Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006)). Although we do not consider multiple debt renegotiations,
our result is also similar to the result of Moraux and Silaghi (2014). They showed that
due to renegotiation costs equity holders give up any more renegotiation round after the
coupon is reduced to a su±ciently low level. We will also return to this point while
examining another aspect in Section 4.3.?
The sensitivities of c0 on LV and CS are counter-intuitive (see the middle right and
bottom left panels of Figure 5). The ¯rm with a higher c0 will be less risky after debt
restructuring. The reason can be explained by the top right and middle left panels. Indeed,
we ¯nd from the panels that, for a higher c0, the coupon reduction c0 ¡ c¤L1 is larger and
the ¯rm's survival time after debt restructuring is longer. Because of this e±cient capital
restructuring on the early timing, the ¯rm with a higher c0 can be less risky after debt
renegotiation. On the other hand, due to the large coupon reduction, the ¯rm needs more
equity ¯nancing to pay back to the debt holders (see the bottom right panel).
4.2.3 Volatility ¾
(Insert Figure 6 around here.)
Figure 6 shows the panels with varying levels of cash °ow uncertainty ¾. In the top
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and middle left panels, EL1(x) and E(x) (x¤L and x
¤
L2) increase (decrease) with a higher
¾. This corresponds to the standard volatility e®ect (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) that
a higher ¾ increases the option value of waiting and delays the liquidation timing. More
notably, we ¯nd that the increase in E(x) (decrease in x¤L) dominates that of EL1(x)
(x¤L2). As a result, E(x) exceeds EL1(x) for ¾ ¸ 0:35. The reason is that the convexity
of shareholders' option to liquidate is stronger in the direct liquidation case than in the
piecemeal liquidation case. Kort, Murto, and Pawlina (2010) also documented a similar
logic in the context of stepwise investment. Our result is consistent with the empirical
evidence in Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012) and Favara, Morellec, Schroth, and Valta
(2014). They showed that debt renegotiation decreases the convexity of shareholders'
claim and their incentives for risk-taking.
The ¯nding that a ¯rm with a high ¾ is more likely to liquidate without debt rene-
gotiation is also consistent with the following empirical evidence. Smaller/younger ¯rms
tend to have a higher ¾, and such ¯rms are more likely to proceed to direct liquidation
(e.g., Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006)). We can see from LV and CS that the ¯rm with a
higher ¾ is more risky, despite that the newly arranged coupon c¤L1 is lower. The graphs
of LV and CS are similar to those presented by Shibata and Nishihara (2015b). In the
bottom right panel, the result on EF is not monotonic but unimodal.
4.2.4 Financing cost kF
(Insert Figure 7 around here.)
Figure 7 shows the panels with varying levels of equity ¯nancing costs kF . EL1(x)
monotonically decreases with kF . In this example, once kF increases beyond 0:8, the
shareholders prefer direct liquidation to debt restructuring. In the ¯gure, we ¯nd that a
higher kF increases c¤L1 and decreases EF ; nevertheless, the ¯nancing cost (16) increases
(see Cost in the bottom right panel). That is, with a higher equity ¯nancing cost, the
shareholders give up a larger coupon reduction. Then, the time interval between debt
renegotiation and ¯nal liquidation becomes shorter with a higher kF . Indeed, the middle
left panel shows that a higher kF increases the ¯nal liquidation trigger x¤L2 while it does
not change the renegotiation trigger x¤L. As well as the liquidation probability, LV and CS
increase with a higher kF . Especially smaller/younger ¯rms tend to face more di±culty in
accessing external ¯nancing during a recession (e.g., Greenwald, Stiglitz, andWeiss (1984),
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)). Taking this
into account, our result is consistent with the empirical evidence that, during a recession,
weaker ¯rms are likely to proceed to direct liquidation rather than debt renegotiation
(e.g., Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006)).
4.2.5 Premium to the debt holders kD
(Insert Figure 8 around here.)
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Figure 8 shows the panels with varying levels of premiums kD, which the debt holders
receive. Although this paper does not model any bargaining game, kD can be proxy for
the debt holders' bargaining power in debt renegotiation. As is shown clearly, EL1(x)
monotonically decreases with kD. In this example, for kD ¸ 0:091, the shareholders
prefer liquidation to debt renegotiation. This negative impact of kD on debt renegotiation
is straightforward and consistent with the previous ¯ndings regarding the debt holders'
bargaining power (e.g., Moraux and Silaghi (2014) and Favara, Morellec, Schroth, and
Valta (2014)). If the debt holders have full bargaining power, they optimally choose the
critical premium kD = 0:091, which is the cross point of EL1(x) and E(x). Note that the
debt holders gain more in debt renegotiation than in direct liquidation as long as kD is
larger than 0.
In Figure 8, c¤L1; x
¤
L2; x
¤
L; LV , and CS do not depend on kD. These are obvious from
the equations (23) and (16). Indeed, the shareholders choose c¤L1 = argmaxcL1 V (x
¤
L; 1¡
a; cL1)¡kFD(x¤L; 1¡a; cL1) regardless of the values of kD. This means that the premium to
the debt holders does not in°uence the capital structure after debt renegotiation. Lastly,
as is easily checked by (15), EF increases with kD (see the bottom right panel) because
the shareholders need to pay back more to the debt holders. We omit the comparative
statics with respect to the renegotiation cost kR because its e®ects are quite similar to
those of kD.
4.2.6 Running cost w
(Insert Figure 9 around here.)
Figure 9 shows the panels with varying levels of running costs w. In the top left panel,
a higher w decreases both EL1(x) and E(x). The e®ect on EL1(x) is larger because the
¯rm that chooses debt renegotiation will operate and su®er from the running cost after the
original liquidation time. In this example, for w ¸ 0:62 the shareholders prefer liquidation
to debt renegotiation. The impact of w is opposite from that of c0 (cf. Figure 5), although
both w and c0 are costs to the equity holders. This di®erence stems from the fact that w,
unlike c0, cannot be reduced in debt renegotiation.
In the middle left panel, we ¯nd that both x¤L2 and x
¤
L increase with w. Furthermore,
the distance between the two triggers monotonically decreases with w. This means that
the ¯rm with a higher w is more risky even when it succeeds in debt renegotiation. LV
and CS in the middle right and the bottom left panels also support this result. Our
result is consistent with the stylized fact that lower-productivity ¯rms tend to fail in debt
renegotiation and proceed to liquidation (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips (1998)).
4.3 Optimal capital structure
So far, we have changed parameter values with the initial coupon c0 ¯xed at 2 in the
base case except for Figure 5. We also check the comparative statics with c0 maximizing
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the ¯rm value at the initial time. The ¯rm chooses an initial coupon c0 for which the
shareholders can choose whether to proceed to debt restructuring or direct liquidation.
Taking account of the shareholders' future behavior contingent on c0, we need to compute
an optimal c0.
For the base parameter (22) where c0 replaced the optimal coupon, we have Table 2,
where the ¯rst and second rows present the optimal capital structure in the case allowing
debt restructuring (DR) and the case with direct liquidation only (L), respectively. LV0
and CS0 denote the leverage ratio and credit spread at the initial time. In the DR case,
we have the optimal coupon c0 = 1:95, which will lead to debt renegotiation rather than
direct liquidation in the future.9 Table 2 shows that the ¯rm that will proceed to debt
renegotiation has a higher c0, LV0, and CS0 than in the direct liquidation case. This is
because, as shown in Figure 5, the ¯rm can gain more surplus from debt renegotiation
when the initial coupon is high. This may be related to a moral hazard problem caused by
prospective debt renegotiation. Our result is similar to the previous ¯ndings. For instance,
Moraux and Silaghi (2014) showed that a ¯rm increases the initial coupon, taking account
of debt renegotiation in the future. Christensen, Flor, Lando, and Miltersen (2014) also
showed that the possibility of debt renegotiation increases the initial leverage ratio because
it reduces the default costs, which is the negative impact of debt ¯nancing.
(Insert Figure 10 around here.)
The comparative statics results, except for ¾ in the previous subsection, remain similar
even when we take the optimal c0 at the initial time, and thus they are omitted here.
Figure 10 shows the panels with varying levels of ¾. Di®erently from Figure 6 in Section
4.2.5, the ¯rm proceeds to debt renegotiation regardless of ¾. We see from the top right
panel that the optimal c0 increases with ¾. Because of the increased c0, the equity holders
can make enough of a coupon reduction (see the gap between c0 and cL1 in the top right
panel) to gain more pro¯ts from debt renegotiation than from direct liquidation. Note
that the new coupon cL1, unlike in Figure 6, increases with ¾, but the gap between c0
and cL1 increases more than in Figure 6. The e±ciency of debt restructuring is also seen
in the gap between x¤L and x
¤
L2 in the middle left panel of Figure 10, compared to that
of Figure 6. In the middle right panel, both LV and LV0 decrease with ¾ in the optimal
capital structure case, di®erently from Figure 6. CS;CS0 and EF have similar shapes to
those of Figure 6.
(Insert Figure 11 around here.)
When we optimally adjust the capital structure, the timing of adjustment also in°u-
ences the results. To see the impact, we present the comparative statics with respect to
the initial state variable x. It is worth noting that in the previous subsection with c0
¯xed, the results do not depend on x. Figure 11 shows the panels with varying levels of x.
9As will be seen in Figure 11 later, an optimal coupon, which maximizes the ¯rm value, may lead to direct
liquidation depending on the parameter values.
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For x · 1:52, the ¯rm is better o® leaving the equity holders to choose liquidation rather
than debt renegotiation.10 Because of this, EL1(x); c¤0; x¤L; LV0 and CS0 jump at x = 1:52.
All graphs, especially LV0 and CS0, have quite di®erent shapes for x 2 (1:52; 1:75) from
those for larger x. This is because in the region the ¯rm dares to choose a higher c0 to
make the equity holders proceed to debt renegotiation rather than liquidation. Recall
that with a higher c0 the equity holders are more likely to proceed to debt restructuring
(see Figure 5). The ¯rm wishes to choose a lower c0, but then the equity holders would
liquidate the ¯rm. Because of this, the ¯rm chooses high c0 (hence, LV0 and CS0) when
x is close to 1:52. This motivation greatly distorts the result for x 2 (1:52; 1:75).
Once x decreases below 1:52, the ¯rm is better o® setting a low c0 and leaving the
shareholders to choose direct liquidation, rather than a su±ciently high c0 to lead to debt
renegotiation. Then, the optimal c¤0 jumps down when x decreases below the threshold. At
the same threshold, the (ex-post) equity value adversely jumps up due to the downward
jump in c¤0. On the other hand, the ¯rm value VL1(x), which can be regarded as the
ex-ante equity value, continuously increases with x. As in Moraux and Silaghi (2014), our
result predicts that the ¯rm is more likely to proceed to direct liquidation when the latest
capital adjustment occurs for a lower state variable.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated whether and how the shareholders of a ¯rm in distress
proceed to direct liquidation or debt restructuring along with partial liquidation. We
showed the following results.
In debt restructuring, the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity
¯nancing to retire the partial debt value. The optimal debt restructuring time is always
equal to the original liquidation time without debt renegotiation because the shareholders
can most e±ciently decrease the debt repayment value on this timing. Most notably, even
if they face high ¯nancing costs, the shareholders do not prefer partial liquidation in debt
restructuring because the costs arise earlier. Instead, they prefer to adjust the coupon
reduction at a small level so that they do not need to pay back a signi¯cant amount to the
debt holders. Our result about the ine±ciency of asset sale is consistent with empirical
¯ndings.
Fewer forced asset sales, lower ¯nancing, renegotiation, and running costs, a lower
premium to the debt holders, a lower volatility, and more debt increase the shareholders'
incentive to choose debt renegotiation to avoid full liquidation. These results suggest
that larger/older/higher-productivity ¯rms are more likely to proceed to debt renegotia-
tion, which is supported by the empirical evidence. When the ¯rm optimizes its capital
structure, taking account of debt renegotiation in the future, it chooses a higher coupon,
10For x · 1:52 (liquidation region), the ¯gure does not depict c¤L1; x¤L2; LV;CS; and EF .
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leverage, and credit spread than in the case without debt renegotiation. The ¯rm tends
to proceed to direct liquidation rather than another debt restructuring shortly after the
capital adjustment.
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Figure 1: The debt renegotiation trigger x¤L1 with varying levels of the fraction of asset sale a.
The other parameter values are set at the base case (22). Note that debt renegotiation, rather
than direct liquidation, is chosen for these parameter values.
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Figure 2: The debt value D(xL; 1; c0) with varying levels of xL. The parameter values are set
at the base case (22).
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Table 1: Base case.
EL1(x) E(x) c
¤
L1 x
¤
L x
¤
L1 x
¤
L2 LV CS EF
5:91 5:58 1:07 1:25 1:25 0:842 0:846 0:0207 1:58
Table 2: Optimal capital structure.
V E c0; c
¤
L1 LV0; LV CS0; CS x
¤
L; x
¤
L2 EF
DR 30:4 6:21 1:95; 1:05 0:796; 0:852 0:0205; 0:0209 1:23; 0:833 1:55
L 30:1 9:58 1:51; N=A 0:682; N=A 0:0134; N=A 1:01; N=A N=A
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Figure 3: Comparative statics with respect to the fraction of asset sale, a. The other parameter
values are set at the base case (22).
24
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4.5
5
5.5
6
a
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4.5
5
5.5
6
a
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4.5
5
5.5
6
a
 
 
EL1 (kF=0.5)
E
EL1 (kF=1)
E
EL1 (kF=1.5)
E
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4.5
5
5.5
6
a
 
 
EL1 (kF=0.5)
E
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4.5
5
5.5
6
a
 
 
EL1 (kF=1)
E
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
4.5
5
5.5
6
a
 
 
EL1 (kF=1.5)
E
Figure 4: EL1(x) and E(x) with respect to the fraction a and the ¯nancing cost kF . The
left and right panels show the values for PL(x; a) = 0:6a
1:01x=(r ¡ ¹) + 2a1:01 (base case) and
PL(x; a) = 0:6ax=(r ¡ ¹) + 2a (linear case). The other parameter values are set at the base
case (22).
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Figure 5: Comparative statics with respect to the initial coupon c0. The other parameter values
are set at the base case (22).
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Figure 6: Comparative statics with respect to the cash °ow volatility ¾. The other parameter
values are set at the base case (22).
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Figure 7: Comparative statics with respect to the ¯nancing cost kF . The other parameter
values are set at the base case (22).
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Figure 8: Comparative statics with respect to the premium to the debt holders kD. The other
parameter values are set at the base case (22).
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Figure 9: Comparative statics with respect to the running cost w. The other parameter values
are set at the base case (22).
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Figure 10: Comparative statics with respect to volatility ¾ in the optimal capital structure
case. The other parameter values are set at the base case (22).
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Figure 11: Comparative statics with respect to the initial state variable x in the optimal capital
structure case. The other parameter values are set at the base case (22).
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